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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Environmental Protection Agency v. EME Homer City
Generation, L.P.,
134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014)
Synopsis
Air pollution emissions pose a difficult problem for Congress and
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).1 Air pollution emitted
in one state may travel downwind and cause harm in another state.2
Without regulations, the downwind states suffer from the inability to
achieve clean air because the state has no authority to regulate air
pollution.3 To address the problem, Congress added a provision to
the Clean Air Act (CAA), called the Good Neighbor Provision.4 The
provision “instructs [s]tates to prohibit in-state sources ‘from
emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will . . . contribute
significantly’ to downwind [s]tates’ ‘nonattainment . . . , or interfere
with maintenance,’ of any EPA-promulgated national air quality
standard.”5 Congress included the Good Neighbor Provision to
establish some level of equity for downwind states by requiring
upwind states that contribute to air pollution to reduce emissions.6 In
interpreting the Good Neighbor Provision, the EPA adopted the
Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (also called the Transport Rule),
which requires consideration of several factors to determine how
much an upwind state must reduce its emissions to improve air
quality in downwind states.7
State and local governments, as well as industry and labor groups,
filed a petition for review of the EPA’s interpretation of the Good
Neighbor Provision.8 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the

1

EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1593 (2014).
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 1598.
2
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Transport Rule and held that the EPA had exceeded agency authority
in developing the Transport Rule standards.9 The Supreme Court
reversed the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that the EPA’s
interpretation of the Good Neighbor Provision was reasonable.10
Background
When air pollution is generated by a state, it is carried downwind
across state boundaries.11 Without regulations, pollution-associated
costs are borne by the state whose air quality is compromised, not
necessarily by the state that produced the pollution.12 Ideally, the
producing state would be responsible for all of the costs incurred as a
result of the air pollution it produces, regardless of where the
negative effects are felt; however, it is difficult to regulate for several
reasons.13 First, it is difficult to identify from which state downwind
pollution originated.14 Pollution from one state may be carried to
several downwind states, some states receive pollution from several
upwind states, and some states both generate and receive pollution.15
Second, pollutants are chemically transformed as they travel
downwind, which causes measurement issues for the EPA.16 The
gasses nitrogen oxide (NOX) and sulfur dioxide (SO2) (collectively
“upwind gasses”) often transform into ozone and fine particulate
matter (PM2.5) (collectively “downwind gasses”).17 The challenge
for the EPA is how to determine what amount of upwind gasses must
be reduced to meet acceptable levels of downwind gasses.18
In 1970, in an effort to address interstate air pollution issues,
Congress directed the EPA to set national ambient air quality
standards (NAAQS) to keep pollutant levels low to protect public

9

Id.
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 1593–94.
14
Id. at 1594.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
10
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health.19 Once NAAQS are set, the CAA requires the EPA to
determine locations where the concentration of pollutants exceeds the
NAAQS (“nonattainment areas”).20 States are required to submit
State Implementation Plans (SIPs) to the EPA within three years of
new or updated NAAQS.21 SIPs must include adequate provisions to
“prohibi[t] . . . any source or other type of emissions activity within
the [s]tate from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will . . .
contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or therefore with
maintenance by, any other [s]tate with respect to any . . .
[NAAQS].”22 This CAA requirement is called the Good Neighbor
Provision.23 If a SIP is missing or inadequate, the EPA must issue a
Federal Implementation Plan (FIP).24
In an effort to explain the scope of the Good Neighbor Provision,
the EPA issued several rules that defined what it meant to “contribute
significantly” to downwind nonattainment.25 The rule at issue, the
Transport Rule, limited NOX and SO2 emissions from twenty-seven
upwind states to meet downwind attainment of three NAAQS.26
Under the Rule, the EPA used a two-step process to determine which
states “contributed significantly” to downwind nonattainment.27
Upwind states were required to eliminate emissions that “(1)
produced one percent or more a NAAQS in at least one downwind
state (step one) and (2) could be eliminated cost-effectively, as
19

Id.
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 1595 (emphasis added).
23
Id. The Good Neighbor Provision was first implemented in 1970 and
revised in 1977. Id. The current formulation of the provision was put in place in
1990. Id.
24
Id. at 1594.
25
Id. at 1595. In 1998, the EPA issued the NOX SIP Call rule, which limited
NOX emission in twenty-three states. Id. The rule was upheld by the D.C. Circuit
in Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (2000). In 2005, the EPA issued the Clean Air
Interstate Rule (CAIR), which regulated both NOX and SO2 emissions. 134 S. Ct.
at 1595. The rule was initially vacated by the D.C. Circuit, but was eventually
upheld on rehearing in North Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d 1176, 1178 (C.A.D.C.
2008). The Transport Rule, issued in 2011, was the EPA’s response to the North
Carolina decision. 134 S. Ct. at 1596.
26
134 S. Ct. at 1596.
27
Id.
20
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determined by [the] EPA (step two).”28 For every state regulated by
the Transport Rule, the EPA determined that the state had not
submitted an adequate SIP, and issued a FIP if the determination was
not challenged within sixty days.29
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling
State and industry respondents petitioned for review of the
Transport Rule in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.30 The court
vacated the rule, holding that the EPA exceeded its statutory
authority by issuing FIPs before states had the chance to put their
own implementation plans into place, and by ignoring the Good
Neighbor Provision’s limits on the EPA’s authority.31 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine “whether the
D.C. Circuit had accurately construed the limits the CAA places on
[the] EPA’s authority.”32
The Supreme Court disagreed with the D.C. Circuit Court’s
holding that states must have the chance to propose SIPs before the
EPA issues a FIP. The Supreme Court found that the text of the
CAA and the Good Neighbor Provision supports the EPA’s
interpretation that an inadequate SIP triggers the EPA’s duty to
develop a FIP “‘at any time’ within two years.”33 The Court found
nothing in the CAA to differentiate an inadequate SIP based on the
Good Neighbor Provision requirements from any of the other
requirements under the CAA.34 There is no written statutory
exception to the triggering of a FIP, and the Court noted that the
reviewing court’s task is “to apply the text of the statute, not to
improve upon it.”35
In response to the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision that the EPA’s
two-step approach to the Good Neighbor Provision exceeded its

28

Id. at 1597.
Id.
30
Id. at 1598.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 1599.
33
Id. at 1600.
34
Id. at 1601.
35
Id. at 1600.
29
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powers under the CAA, the Supreme Court concluded that the EPA’s
method of allocation of emission reductions was “a permissible,
workable, and equitable interpretation.”36 The statute requires
upwind states “to eliminate those ‘amounts’ of pollution that
‘contribute significantly to nonattainment’ in downwind States.”37 In
light of the absence of statutory direction regarding how to reduce
upwind emissions in only those amounts, the Supreme Court applied
Chevron deference38 to the EPA’s interpretation.39 The statutory
ambiguity allowed the EPA to use its discretion to find a reasonable
solution.40 The court of appeals believed that the Good Neighbor
Provision included a proportionality requirement on emission
restrictions.41 However, nothing in the text of the statute forces the
EPA to make its determinations based on a state’s proportional
contribution to the problem.42 The Supreme Court rejected the D.C.
Circuit’s determination and gave deference to the EPA’s authority to
reasonably interpret the Good Neighbor Provision of the CAA.43
Dissent
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, arguing that
the Good Neighbor Provision “specified quite precisely the
responsibility of an upwind [s]tate,” and that unelected agency
personnel exercised inappropriate lawmaking authority by requiring
pollution reductions on the basis of cost-effectiveness rather than in
proportion to the amount of pollutants each state produces.44 They
recognized that regulating the problem of interstate pollution is

36

Id. at 1610.
Id. at 1603 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i) (2012)).
38
Chevron deference is a two-step process used to answer questions of
statutory construction in administrative law. Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). If the statute’s intent is unambiguous,
then the statute’s construction controls. Id. at 842–43. If the statute’s intent is
ambiguous, then the agency’s construction controls. Id.
39
134 S.Ct. at 1604.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 1610.
44
Id.
37
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“complex and difficult,” but argued that the problem may not be
regulated by the EPA in a manner inconsistent with the
administrative structure enacted by Congress, regardless of the
seriousness of the problem.45
Impact
In this case, the Supreme Court determined the EPA’s authority
to interpret and enforce the CAA. It was a straightforward
application of Chevron deference to allow the EPA the freedom to
reasonably interpret ambiguous provisions in the CAA. While the
Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals, the Supreme
Court was not attempting to defend the practicality of the EPA’s
actions. Even though the EPA may not be utilizing the best methods
of enforcing the Good Neighbor Provision of the CAA, the Supreme
Court noted that it is not the role of the courts to improve upon
statutes.46 It is up to the legislature to determine which statutory
limits and requirements need to be placed on the EPA within the
CAA standards. Here, the Supreme Court addressed the conflicting
viewpoints of the legislature and judiciary and found that the EPA
was acting within agency authority.
Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio,
134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014)
Synopsis
The Immigration and Nationality Act47 allows U.S. citizens and
lawful permanent residents (LPRs) to petition for spouses, siblings,
and minor children to obtain immigrant visas.48 A sponsored
individual is referred to as the petition’s principal beneficiary.49 If
the principal beneficiary has any unmarried children under the age of
twenty-one, those children (called derivative beneficiaries) are

45

Id. at 1621.
Id. at 1600.
47
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2012).
48
Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio, 134 S.Ct. 2191, 2196 (2014).
49
Id.
46
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allowed the same immigration status and order of consideration of
the parent—meaning when a visa becomes available to a principal
beneficiary, a visa also automatically becomes available to any
derivative beneficiary as well.50 However, since the immigration
process can take years to complete, some beneficiaries (both
principal and derivative) reach age twenty-one—and therefore “age
out”—after the sponsoring petition was filed and a visa became
available, but before completing the immigration process.51 In that
situation, the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA)52 ensures that the
time spent processing immigration papers does not count against the
beneficiary in determining his or her status.53 But sometimes a
beneficiary ages out while waiting for a visa to become available.54
In this case, the Supreme Court determined whether the CSPA
provides a remedy to beneficiaries who were under age twenty-one
when the sponsoring petition was filed, but aged out before a visa
became available.55 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
interpreted the CSPA as providing relief to only beneficiaries who
did or could have qualified as principal beneficiaries.56 The Ninth
Circuit reversed the BIA’s determination, finding that the CSPA was
unambiguous and granted automatic conversion to all aged out
derivative beneficiaries.57 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
overturned the Ninth Circuit decision, deferring to the BIA’s
construction of the statute. 58
Background
An immigrant visa is a “highly sought-after document” because it
is required for aliens to enter and permanently reside in the United
States.59 Not everyone may obtain an immigration visa; under the
50

Id.
Id.
52
Pub. L. No. 107-208, 116 Stat. 927 (2002).
53
134 S. Ct. at 2196.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 2196–97.
56
Id. at 2197.
57
Id. at 2202.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 2197.
51
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Immigration and Nationality Act, a person must fall into one of six
immigration categories to be considered. One of those categories is
for immediate relatives; the remaining five categories are for
“family-sponsored” immigrants, which includes more distant
relatives of U.S. citizens.60 In order to obtain an immigration visa,
the sponsoring U.S. citizen must file a petition for the principal
beneficiary.61 If the principal beneficiary is an immediate family
member, then he or she receives the visa as soon as the sponsoring
petition is approved; however, if the principal beneficiary falls into
one of the family-sponsored categories, then approval of the
sponsoring petition gets the beneficiary a place in line for a visa.62
The principal beneficiary’s status also applies to any derivative
beneficiaries.63
The time it takes between approval of the sponsoring petition and
receipt of a visa can take many months or years.64 There are a
maximum number of visas allowed in a year for each familysponsored category, and the demand for visas usually exceeds the
supply.65 Because of the amount of time it takes between petition
approval and availability of a visa, many people who qualified for a
visa when the petition was approved age out and are no longer
qualified when the visa becomes available.
Congress enacted the CSPA to address the treatment of “oncebut-no-longer-minor aliens.”66 Section 1151(f)(1) allows immediate
relatives to use their age as of the petition filing date to determine
whether they satisfy the age requirements.67 Section 1153(h)(1)
explains how to determine the age of an alien seeking to immigrate
under one of the other immigration categories.68 Under this section,
an alien cannot age out because of bureaucratic delays, but time spent
simply waiting for a visa to become available is included in the age

60

Id.
Id.
62
Id. at 2198.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 2199.
65
Id. at 2198.
66
Id. at 2199.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 2200.
61
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determination.69 If a beneficiary ages out before a visa becomes
available, section 1153(h)(3) automatically converts the beneficiary’s
petition to an “appropriate category.”70 The BIA considered the
meaning of section 1153(h)(3) in Matter of Wang.71
Wang was the principal beneficiary of a family preference visa
that his U.S. citizen sister filed for him in 1992.72 At the time, Wang
had a ten-year-old daughter who qualified as a derivative
beneficiary.73 Wang waited for a visa for over a decade and by the
time one was available, his daughter was twenty-two, and therefore
too old to qualify as a child derivative beneficiary to Wang.74 Wang
used the visa to travel to the United States and became a legal
permanent resident.75 He then filed a new petition for his daughter,
with himself as the legal sponsor instead of his sister.76 Wang argued
that under the CSPA, his daughter’s petition should automatically
convert and she should be able to retain the original priority date.77
The BIA rejected the argument, stating that the statute doesn’t
expressly state which petitions qualify for automatic conversion, and
thus applied its own administrative discretion in the face of the
statutory ambiguity.78 The BIA looked to the “recognized meaning”
of the words “automatic conversion” in immigration law.79
According to the BIA, this language only applied when a petition
could “move seamlessly from one family preference category to
another—not when a new sponsor was needed to fit a beneficiary
into a different category.”80 There was no indication that Congress
intended to expand the use of the “automatic conversion” concept in
immigration procedures.81 Because Wang’s daughter did not have a
69

Id. at 2200–01.
Id. at 2201 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) (2012)).
71
25 I. & N. Dec. 28 (2009).
72
134 S. Ct. at 2201.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 2202.
70
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qualifying relationship with the original visa sponsor, her petition
could not “automatically convert,” and she had to go to the start of
the visa availability line.82
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling
Respondents in this case are the principal beneficiaries of familysponsored petitions filed by U.S. citizens (a parent in one case, and a
sibling in the other case).83 Each respondent also had a child who
was under the age of twenty-one at the time the petition was filed,
and was therefore considered a derivative beneficiary.84 But by the
time visas became available, all of the respondents’ derivative
beneficiaries were over twenty-one and were unable to obtain visas.85
Respondents immigrated to the United States without their children,
and then filed petitions for them, arguing that they should receive the
same priority date as the original petitions.86 The U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services denied their requests and placed the
children at the start of the priority line.87 The parents brought a
suit.88
The District Court applied the BIA’s interpretation of section
1153(h)(3) in Wang, and granted summary judgment to the
Government.89 The Ninth Circuit first affirmed the judgment, but
granted rehearing en banc and reversed, concluding that the statute
was unambiguous and the BIA was not entitled to deference.90 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit
split on the meaning of the statute.91 The Court overturned the Ninth
Circuit, holding that the statutory ambiguity required deference to the
expert interpretation of the implementing agency, the BIA.92
82

Id. at 2201.
Id. at 2202.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 2203.
83

Fall 2014

Legal Summaries

581

The Court applied Chevron deference93 to the BIA’s
interpretation of section 1153(h)(3).94 The statute is ambiguous
because it “addresses the issue in divergent ways,” making it possible
to come to alternative reasonable conclusions.95 The first part of
section 1153(h)(3) reads: “If the age of an alien is determined under
paragraph (1) to be [twenty-one] years of age or older . . . .”96 This is
a condition that all aged-out beneficiaries meet.97 But the second part
of the section states: “[T]he alien’s petition shall automatically be
converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the
original priority date issued upon receipt of the original position.”98
This clause instructs immigration officials to “convert” the
beneficiary’s petition from a category for children to an
“appropriate” adult category.99 The conversion is a change in
category only, not a change in petition or sponsor.100 Therefore, only
beneficiaries whose petitions can be automatically converted into a
different category—beneficiaries who retain qualifying relationships
with their sponsor before and after turning twenty-one—are covered
by the section despite the inclusive language at the beginning of the
section.101
The respondents’ children in this case did not retain qualifying
beneficiary status after turning twenty-one because, although the
respondents themselves were principal beneficiaries of the sponsors,
their children only counted as derivative beneficiaries while they
were still under twenty-one.102 Once they reached twenty-one, they

93

Chevron deference is a two-step process used to answer questions of
statutory construction in administrative law. Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). If the statute’s intent is unambiguous,
then the statute’s construction controls. Id. at 842–43. If the statute’s intent is
ambiguous, then the agency’s construction controls. Id.
94
134 S. Ct. at 2203.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 2203–04.
100
Id. at 2204.
101
Id. at 2206.
102
Id. at 2206–07.
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were merely grandchildren of the sponsors, which is not a
relationship that warrants family preference under U.S. immigration
law.103 For the children to fit into a new category, they must find
new sponsors, which does not qualify as “automatic conversion.”104
The Court held that section 1153(h)(3)’s language permitted the
IAB to discriminate between aged-out beneficiaries, but did not
require discrimination.105 Because of the section’s ambiguity, the
IAB had to option to decide how to interpret it.106 Because the IAB’s
decision was a reasonable interpretation of the statute, the Court must
defer to the interpretation.107
Concurrence
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in the
judgment, agreeing with most of the plurality’s opinion.108 However,
the Chief Justice disagreed with the plurality’s suggestion that
deference was warranted because of a conflict between the two parts
of section 1153(h)(3).109 He explained that deference should be
given to an agency’s interpretation because it is presumed that
Congress intended to give responsibility to the agency to resolve
ambiguity in the statute, not because the statute directly contradicts
itself.110 “Chevron is not a license for an agency to repair a statute
that does not make sense.”111 But in this case, Roberts did not
believe that section 1153(h)(3) had conflicting clauses; rather, the
first clause stated a condition and did not actually grant relief to
anyone.112 The second clause was the “operative provision” that
explained what an aged-out beneficiary was entitled to.113
Regardless, since the interpretation offered by the BIA was
103

Id. at 2207.
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 2214.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 2215.
104
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reasonable and consistent with the ordinary meaning of the statute,
Roberts concurred with the plurality’s holding.114
Justice Alito’s Dissent
Justice Alito disagreed with the plurality’s opinion because he
believed the statute made a clear point: “If the age of an alien is
determined under [§ 1153(h)(3)] to be [twenty-one] years of age or
older . . . , the alien’s petition shall automatically be converted to the
appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original priority
date issued upon receipt of the original petition.”115 With such a
clear statutory command, Justice Alito argued, the BIA was not free
to come up with a contradictory interpretation.116
Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer and Justice Thomas,
disagreed with the plurality’s opinion because section 1153(h)(3)
“provides a clear answer” to the question of which aged-out children
are entitled to retain priority dates: aged-out children are entitled to
retain their priority dates as long as they are “‘determined to be
[twenty-one] years of age or older for purposes of’ derivative
beneficiary status.”117 Based on that language, all aged-out children
that qualified under the CSPA satisfy the condition would be entitled
to retain their priority dates.118
Notwithstanding the “unambiguous” language in the clause,
Justice Sotomayor argued that the plurality allowed the BIA to
interpret section 1153(h)(3) without regard to the “obvious ways in
which [the section could] operate as a coherent whole and instead
construe[d] the statute as a self-contradiction . . . .”119 Because
Chevron deference should be applied to cases in which the statute is
insufficiently specific or diametrically opposed, deference was

114

Id. at 2215–16.
Id. at 2216 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) (2012)).
116
Id.
117
Id. at 2216–17 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) (2012)).
118
Id. at 2217.
119
Id.
115
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inappropriately applied in this case, according to Justice
Sotomayor.120 The Court should have applied a straightforward
interpretation of the statute, without resorting to agency deference.121
Impact
“This is the kind of case Chevron was built for.”122 The Supreme
Court utilized this key deference principle to clarify the roles of the
administrative agency and the courts. While Congress may have
meant to imply that minor derivative beneficiaries would be eligible
for the CSPA remedy, they failed to legislate clearly.123 Due to the
potential legislative oversight, the administrative agency operated
within its authority to understand and interpret the law in a
reasonable manner.124 The BIA “chose a textually reasonable
construction consonant with its view of the purposes and policies
underlying immigration law,” and the Court saw no reason to assume
control over the agency’s expert authority.125 However, the BIA’s
determination of CSPA qualifications has far reaching consequences
for the already tumultuous immigration process.126 The correct
means for addressing the issue and seeking a remedy for derivative
beneficiaries who have aged out of the process is through legislation
with such inclusive language.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)
Synopsis
Owners of closely held corporations brought action against the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), seeking to enjoin the demand of

120

Id. at 2219–20.
Id. at 2228.
122
Id. at 2213.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
See id., Part B, at 2199–2202.
121
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the Patient Protections and Affordable Care Act (ACA) that the
corporations provide health-insurance coverage for certain
contraceptives.127 The corporations were owned by families with
sincere Christian beliefs that life begins at conception.128 They
argued that it would violate their religious beliefs to facilitate access
to contraceptive methods that they believed caused abortions.129 The
RFRA “prohibits the Federal Government from taking any action that
substantially burdens the exercise of religion unless that action
constitutes the least restrictive means of serving a compelling
government interest.”130 In this case, the question for the Supreme
Court was whether the HHS was allowed to force the corporations to
provide insurance coverage for contraceptive methods under the
RFRA.131
First, the Court determined that corporations constitute “persons”
under the RFRA, and therefore the RFRA applied to the case.132
Then, applying the RFRA to the ACA mandate, the Court held that,
although the HHS’s mandate served a compelling government
interest, the contraceptive regulations substantially burdened the
exercise of religion and did not constitute the least restrictive means
of serving the government’s compelling interest in ensuring access to
healthcare.133
Background
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
The RFRA was enacted in 1993 to “provide very broad protection
for religious liberty.”134 In Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,135 the Supreme Court rejected

127

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764–66 (2014).
Id.
129
Id. at 2759.
130
Id. (emphasis added).
131
Id.
132
Id. at 2768.
133
Id. at 2759.
134
Id. at 2760.
135
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
128
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the test that had formerly been used to determine whether
government actions violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.136 Congress enacted the RFRA137 in response to Smith
to ensure that the government could not “substantially burden a
person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability.”138 Under the RFRA, the government may not
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion unless the
government can demonstrate that the burden: (1) furthers a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that interest.139
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
In general, the ACA “requires employers with [fifty] or more
full-time employees to offer ‘a group health plan or group health
insurance coverage’ that provides ‘minimum essential coverage.’”140
“Minimum essential coverage” includes coverage for preventive care
and screenings for women, which includes “approved contraceptive
methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and
counseling.”141 Covered employers who do not provide the required
coverage are charged a significant fee.142
Certain religious
136

134 S. Ct. at 2760. The Court in Smith rejected a balancing test that
considered “whether the challenged action imposed a substantial burden on the
practice of religion, and if it did, whether it was needed to serve a compelling
interest.” Id. In Smith, two Native American Church members were denied
unemployment benefits after they were fired for consuming peyote. Id. Although
their peyote consumption was for religious purposes, the state denied
unemployment benefits because peyote consumption was a crime. Id. The Court
upheld the state’s decision, reasoning that “neutral, generally applicable laws may
be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling
government interest.” Id. at 2760–61.
137
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to -4 (2012).
138
134 S. Ct. at 2761.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 2762 (quoting 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A(f)(2), 4980H(a), (c)(2) (2012)).
141
Id. (quoting 77 Fed. Reg. 8725). Congress did not specify what “preventive
care” included, but instead authorized the Health Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA) to make that determination. Id. The HRSA produced the
Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines in 2011. Id.
142
Id. Covered employers who provide inadequate coverage may be charged
up to $100 per day per inadequately-covered individual. Id. Covered employers
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employers and religious nonprofit organizations are exempted from
the contraceptive coverage requirement.143
Although most contraceptive methods prevent egg fertilization,
the methods of contraception at issue in these cases prevent
pregnancy by inhibiting a fertilized egg from attaching to the
uterus.144 This method of contraception is akin to abortion by some
religious groups.145
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling
Facts
In the first case, the Hahn family, devout Mennonites, owned and
operated a closely held for-profit corporation called Conestoga Wood
Specialties.146 The Hahns were the sole owners of the corporation;
they controlled the board of directors and held all of the company’s
voting shares.147 They sought to operate their business in a way that
reflected their Christian beliefs, which included the belief that human
life begins at conception.148 Therefore, they refused to provide health
insurance coverage for the types of contraceptive methods they
considered abortifacients.149 They sued the HHS under the RFRA in
an effort to enjoin the application of the ACA’s contraceptive
coverage requirement insofar as it required Conestoga to provide
coverage for the types of contraception that violated the Hahns’s
religious beliefs.150
The district court denied a preliminary
injunction, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.151
In the second case, the Green family was a Christian family that
owned two for-profit businesses: a Christian bookstore called
who do not provide health coverage at all may be required to pay up to $2,000 per
year for each full-time employee. Id.
143
Id. at 2763.
144
Id. at 2762.
145
Id. at 2759.
146
Id. at 2764.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 2764–65.
150
Id. at 2765.
151
Id.
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Mardel, and a nationwide chain arts-and-crafts store called Hobby
Lobby.152 The Green family retained sole control over both
corporations.153 Like the Hahns, the Greens ran their companies in
accordance with their religious beliefs.154 All Mardel and Hobby
Lobby stores closed on Sunday, and they did not sell products that
facilitated or promoted alcohol consumption.155
They also
contributed company profits to Christian missionaries and
ministries.156 Since they believed that some of the contraceptive
methods required under the ACA operated in violation of their
religious beliefs, they too sued the HHS under the RFRA in an effort
to enjoin the application of the ACA’s contraceptive coverage
requirement insofar as it required Mardel and Hobby Lobby to
provide coverage for the types of contraception that violated their
religious beliefs.157
The district court denied a preliminary
injunction.158 Contrary to the Third Circuit’s decision, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that the
contraceptive coverage requirement was a substantial burden on the
exercise of religion, and that the HHS had failed to show a
compelling interest.159 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
address the circuit split.160
Corporate Personhood
The RFRA prohibits the federal government from substantially
burdening a person’s exercise of religion unless it is in furtherance of
a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest.161 The first issue was to determine whether
the three for-profit corporations constituted “persons” under the

152

Id.
Id.
154
Id. at 2766.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id.
153

Fall 2014

Legal Summaries

589

RFRA.162 Since the RFRA does not define the term “person,” the
Court applied the Dictionary Act163 definition: a “person” includes
“corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies,
and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”164 The Court
found that there was no intent in the passing of the RFRA to depart
from the Dictionary Act definition of person, which includes
corporations.165 The Court also considered RFRA claims brought by
nonprofit corporations in several cases,166 thus demonstrating that a
nonprofit corporation may be considered a person under the
RFRA.167 The HHS conceded that a nonprofit corporation may be a
“person” within the meaning of the RFRA, and the Court did not find
any clear distinction between for-profit and nonprofit corporations
that would allow one to retain “personhood” rights under the RFRA
while denying the other.168
The HHS argued that for-profit corporations were not covered by
the RFRA because they could not exercise religion.169 They first
argued that the RFRA was essentially a codification of the pre-Smith
Free Exercise balancing test, and because none of the pre-Smith cases
held that a for-profit corporation had free-exercise rights, freeexercise protection does not extend to RFRA cases.170 The Court
rejected this argument, mainly because nothing in the RFRA suggests
that it was meant to codify the pre-Smith rule.171
The HHS also argued that for-profit corporations were not
covered by the RFRA because determining the sincere religious

162

Id. at 2768–69.
“[The Court must] look to the Dictionary Act . . . ‘[i]n determining the
meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise.’” Id. at
2768 (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)).
164
Id. at 2768; 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
165
134 S. Ct. at 2768.
166
See, i.e., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC,
132 S. Ct. 694 (2012); Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficenta Uniao de
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
167
134 S. Ct. at 2769.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 2772.
171
Id.
163
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beliefs of large, publicly traded for-profit corporations would be so
difficult as a practical matter that Congress could not have intended
the RFRA to apply to for-profit corporations.172 The Court found,
however, that because the corporations at issue in this case were
closely held and entirely owned by members of individual families,
the sincerity of their religious views was easily discernable.173
Therefore, the Court held that “a federal regulation’s restriction on
the activities of a for-profit closely held corporation must comply
with [the] RFRA.”174
Substantial Burden on Religious Exercise
Because it determined that the RFRA applied in this case, the
Court next addressed whether the contraceptive coverage
requirement placed a substantial burden on the exercise of religion.175
The Court entertained two arguments from the HHS.176 First, the
HHS argued that the ACA mandate requiring employers to either
provide healthcare coverage or face a financial penalty did not
constitute a substantial burden because the penalty was less than the
cost of providing health insurance to employees.177 The Court
rejected this argument finding that the HHS’s claim was unsupported
and the burden would be a competitive disadvantage to the
corporation.178
The HHS’s second argument was that the connection between
providing healthcare coverage for contraception and the morally
objectionable action (destruction after conception) was too
attenuated.179 The Court held that this argument wrongly addressed
the issue of whether the religious belief asserted was reasonable
rather than addressing whether the HHS demand placed a substantial

172

Id. at 2774.
Id.
174
Id. at 2775.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 2775–79.
177
Id. at 2776.
178
Id. at 2777.
179
Id.
173
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burden on religious exercise.180 Traditionally, the Court has held that
a sincere religious belief that sets a moral standard must only be
found to reflect an “honest conviction” to qualify as religious
exercise.181 The Court found that there was a substantial burden on
the corporations to either provide health insurance or face a heavy
financial penalty that violated a sincerely held religious conviction.182
Compelling Government Interest and Least Restrictive Means
Once the Court found that the HHS imposed a substantial burden
on the religious exercise of the corporations, the Court next evaluated
whether the HHS showed that their demand “(1) [was] in furtherance
of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) [was] the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.”183 The Court found it unnecessary to adjudicate the first
part of the issue, and assumed that the interest in providing cost-free
access to contraception for employees under employer-provided
group health plans constituted a compelling government interest.184
The Court chose instead to consider the second half of the test,
whether the contraceptive mandate was the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling government interest.185 Noting the
“exceptionally demanding” nature of the least-restrictive means
standard, the Court argued that the least restrictive way of providing
contraception coverage would be for the government to pay for it.186
It is likely that the cost to allow closely held corporations to defer the
cost of certain contraceptives to the government would be minor, as
the government has already taken on a heavy financial burden
through the passage of the ACA.187 This would alleviate the burden
on the individual corporations while still ensuring contraceptive

180

Id. at 2778.
Id. at 2779.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 2780.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 2781.
181
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coverage.188 While the Court cannot make decisions to create new
programs, the Court still used that analysis to determine that the HHS
did not employ the least restrictive means in furthering its
governmental interest.189 Thus, the Court’s final determination was
that “the contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held
corporations, violate[d the] RFRA.”190
Dissent
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Breyer, and
Kagan, disagreed with the majority’s opinion.191 Ginsburg first
argued that the corporations did not have Free Exercise Clause claims
because, under Smith, “the ACA’s contraceptive coverage
requirement applies generally, it is ‘otherwise valid,’ it trains on
women’s well[-]being, not on the exercise of religion, and any effect
it has on such exercise is incidental.”192 But even if Smith did not
control, Ginsburg said, an exemption would not be granted to the
corporations because it would “significantly impinge on the interests
of third parties” by overriding the interests of employees and their
covered dependents, who would not necessarily hold the same
religious convictions.193
Ginsburg then argues that the corporations’ RFRA claims must
fail because the RFRA was simply a codification of pre-Smith law
and therefore did not create any new rights.194 If one referred to the
pre-Smith body of law, Ginsburg argued, then each step of the
analysis would have been determined differently, and the Court
would have found that there was no satisfactory alternative that
would have served the government’s compelling interests.195

188

Id. at 2780.
Id. at 2781–82.
190
Id. at 2785.
191
Id. at 2787.
192
Id. at 2790 (quoting Emp’t Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Or. V. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990)).
193
Id.
194
Id. at 2791.
195
Id. at 2793–2803.
189
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Impact
Considered “the most controversial Supreme Court decision” in
2014, this case was heavily politicized and drew attention to the
political divisiveness of the decision.196 This decision is an important
clarification of the recently implemented ACA and could lead to
further suits brought by other closely held corporations seeking
exemption from providing insurance coverage of certain healthcare
procedures. One practical implication of this decision is the fact that
Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga Wood Specialties may now
refuse to cover certain types of contraceptives under their employer
group health insurance, which sets a precedent for more closely held
corporation exceptions to the ACA. More litigation will likely arise
now that the Supreme Court has ruled on one aspect of the
relationship between the ACA and the RFRA in employer provided
group insurance plans.

UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
Atrium Medical Center v. United States Department of
Health and Human Services,
766 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2014)
Synopsis
Two groups of hospitals challenged calculations the Secretary of
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) used to
determine how much each hospital was paid for inpatient services
under Medicare Part A.197 Two types of programs were at issue: a
short-term disability program and a part-time weekend work program
(Baylor Plan).198 The hospitals opposed the Secretary’s decision to
include the hours associated with each program in the calculations for
196

Richard A. Epstein, The Defeat of the Contraceptive Mandate in Hobby
Lobby: Right Results, Wrong Reasons, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 35, 35 (2013–
2014).
197
Atrium Med. Ctr. v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 766
F.3d 560, 564 (6th Cir. 2014).
198
Id.

594

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

34-2

inpatient services reimbursements.199 The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to support the
Secretary’s determination to include the programs’ hours. 200
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling
Background
Under Medicare Part A, a fixed, predetermined formula called the
prospective payment system is used to determine how much hospitals
are reimbursed for inpatient medical services.201
Section
1395ww(d)(3)(E)(i) of the Medicare Act requires the Secretary to
adjust reimbursements to account for differences in the cost of labor
in a given area.202 The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) evaluates reports submitted by each hospital to determine the
hospital’s labor costs.203 The data is used to calculate the average
cost of labor in a given area—called the wage index—and that
amount is used to establish the nationwide federal rate and make
regional adjustments.204 “Wages,”205 “wage-related costs,”206 and
“paid hours”207 make up the components of the wage index.208
Hospitals prefer to report fewer paid hours because paid hours lower
the region’s index and result in decreased reimbursement for
inpatient services.209 Since wage costs are tied to paid hours, a
199

Id.
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(3)(E)(i) (2012).
203
Atrium, 766 F.3d at 564.
204
Id. at 564–65.
205
“‘Wages’ are . . . the dollar value of every hour the hospital paid its
employees.” Id. at 565.
206
“‘Wage-related costs’ are essentially fringe benefits, like health insurance
and retirement plans, and are not linked to paid hours.” Id.
207
“‘Paid hours’ are the actual hours associated with an employee’s wages
rather than simply the amount of time an employee spent working at the hospital;
for example, paid hours includes ‘paid lunch hours’ and ‘paid holiday, vacation,
and sick leave hours.’” Id.
208
Id. at 564. Here is a simplified version of the formula used to calculate the
wage index: (wages + wage-related costs) / (paid hours). Id. at 565.
209
Id.
200
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hospital would not want to report a cost as a wage that other hospitals
in the same region reported as a wage-related cost because it would
lower the hospital’s wage index in comparison to the other hospitals
in the region.210
Standards of Review
The Secretary’s decision to count short-term disability payments
and Baylor Plan payments in her determination of reimbursement
adjustments for that region was reviewed de novo.211 First, the court
determined that the treatment of program payments was entitled to
Chevron deference,212 following Congress’s intention to grant
exceptionally broad discretion to the Secretary in defining “wages,”
“wage-related,” and “paid hours.”213 Then, the court determined that
the Secretary’s decision also merited Auer deference214 to determine
whether the decision was arbitrary or capricious. Thus, the Secretary
had discretion to formulate the wage index as long as she did not
arbitrarily treat the same input differently for different hospitals.215
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the Secretary’s construction of the
Medicare Act was neither contrary to the statute nor arbitrary or
capricious.216

210

Id.
Id. at 566.
212
Chevron deference is a two-step process used to answer questions of
statutory construction in administrative law. Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). If the statute’s intent is unambiguous,
then the statute’s construction controls. Id. at 842–43. If the statute’s intent is
ambiguous, then the agency’s construction controls. Id.
213
766 F.3d at 566.
214
Even if an agency’s interpretation of a statute controls under Chevron, the
interpretation may nevertheless be rejected if it is arbitrary or capricious. Id. at
567. Under Auer, the agency’s interpretation is controlling unless it is “plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Id. (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519
U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
215
Id. at 569.
216
Id. at 575.
211
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The Secretary’s Decision: Short-Term Disability Payments
Most hospitals have insurance to cover short-term disability
payments, and those insurance premiums are considered “wagerelated” costs.217 However, some hospitals, including plaintiffs in
this case, choose instead to make short-term disability payments out
of general funds through the payroll process.218 This process requires
accounting for more paid hours, which lowers the wage index
determination for that hospital group and ultimately produces lower
reimbursements.219 The plaintiffs alleged that treating typical
insurance premiums as “wage-related” and short-term disability
payments made through general funds as “wages” was an
inconsistent treatment of costs, violating the Medicare Act’s mandate
that the wage index be uniform and consistent.220
The Sixth Circuit relied on the decision in Barnhart, in which the
Supreme Court granted Chevron deference to the Social Security
Administration to interpret details of the Social Security Act’s
administration because the Act was complex, broadly applicable, and
required agency expertise.221 The Sixth Circuit applied the same
analysis in this case, and held that the Secretary’s interpretation of
the Medicare Act as it applied to classifying non-insurance shortterm disability payments did not obviously conflict with the
statute.222 Even though insurance programs were treated differently
from non-insurance programs, because hospitals using the noninsurance short-term disability payment process were not treated
differently than similarly situated hospitals that used insurance to
make short-term disability payments, there was no violation of the
Medicare Act’s uniformity requirement.223 The Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s holding that the Secretary’s

217

Id. at 570.
Id.
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
Id. at 573 (citing Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 225 (2002)).
222
Id.
223
Id.
218
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determination of the Medicare Act was not manifestly contrary and
that her reasoning was neither arbitrary nor capricious.224
The Secretary’s Decision: Baylor Plan Hours
In order to encourage weekend work, many hospitals offer an
arrangement referred to as the “Baylor Plan,” which grants a fulltime salary and accompanying benefits to an individual who works
two weekend shifts.225 An employee who works two twelve-hour
weekend shifts is to be paid as a full-time employee; therefore, the
payroll records forty paid hours per week for that individual.226
The plaintiffs in this case challenged the determination that the
unworked hours in the Baylor Plan were to be counted as “paid
hours” and included in the wage index calculation.227 Unlike Baylor
Plan hours, bonuses and overtime hours are not considered “paid
hours,” and thus are not included in the wage index.228 Plaintiffs
argued that unworked Baylor Plan hours were merely an accounting
mechanism to calculate the premium per hour incentive for
employees who worked these undesirable shifts.229 The Secretary
defended the categorization of Baylor Plan hours as paid hours,
stating that paid hours are a more appropriate reflection of an
employee’s salary, and recording the non-worked hours as paid hours
allowed employees to receive full-time benefits.230
Because there was no question of statutory construction, the court
applied Auer, rather than Chevron, deference to the Secretary’s
decision.231 The court found that defining Baylor Plan hours as “paid
hours” rather than some version of bonuses was neither arbitrary nor
capricious because it was an accurate representation of the reality of
the Baylor Plan and how the hospitals themselves treated Baylor Plan

224

Id.
Id. at 574.
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
Id. at 574–75.
229
Id. at 575.
230
Id.
231
Id.; see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
225
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employees as full-time employees.232 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s holding.233
Impact
Classification of expenses is crucial to hospitals that serve a
significant portion of patients relying on Medicare coverage. The
more paid hours a hospital has to report, the lower its region’s wage
index; a lower index equates to lower reimbursement for inpatient
services.234 A hospital would therefore prefer to report as few paid
hours as possible, or at least refrain from reporting something as
“wage” that other hospitals are reporting as “wage-related.”235 With
such a large proportion of the federal budget allocated for Medicare
coverage, and approximately 54 million people benefiting from that
coverage236, the reimbursement of Medicare funds is a far-reaching
complexity requiring the Sixth Circuit to “grapple with some of ‘the
most completely impenetrable texts within human experiences,’
statutes and regulations that ‘one approaches at the level of
specificity herein demanded with dread.’”237 It is likely that further
examinations of these “impenetrable texts” will continue to reach the
courts due to the need for greater clarification.
Avila v. Los Angeles Police Department,
758 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2014)
Synopsis
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court
decision in favor of Leonard Avila, a former Los Angeles Police
Officer.238 Avila claimed that he was fired from the Los Angeles
232

Atrium, 766 F.3d at 575.
Id.
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
Medicare at a Glance, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Sept.
2, 2014), http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-at-a-glance-fact-sheet/.
237
Atrium, 766 F.3d at 564 (quoting Rehab Ass’n of Va. v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d
1444, 1450 (4th Cir. 1994)).
238
Avila v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 758 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014).
233
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Police Department (LAPD) due to his testimony in a Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) lawsuit brought by a fellow officer.239 Avila
brought an action against the LAPD and the City of Los Angeles
(collectively, the City) for violations of the FLSA anti-retaliation
provision.240 The jury found in favor of Avila and awarded
attorney’s fees and liquidated damages.241 The City appealed the
decision, claiming that Avila had been terminated for insubordination
because he failed to claim overtime.242 The LAPD’s disciplinary
body, the Board of Rights (BOR), had previously found Avila guilty
of insubordination and recommended termination.243 The City
argued that the BOR determination precluded Avila’s retaliation
claim.244 The district court found that it did not, and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed.245 The City also argued on appeal that the jury was
not properly instructed; however, the Ninth Circuit found no
reversible error and upheld the district court decision.246
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling
Leonard Avila testified under subpoena in a FLSA suit brought
by Edward Maciel against the City of Los Angeles.247 Maciel sought
overtime pay for working through his lunch hour.248 Avila testified
that it was common practice to work through lunch and not claim
overtime.249 Avila stated that he, along with his supervisors,
operated under an “unwritten policy of not claiming overtime for
working through lunch.”250 After testifying in the FLSA suit, the
LAPD brought an investigation against Avila and the other officer

239

Id. at 1098.
Id. at 1099; see also 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2012).
241
Avila, 758 F.3d at 1105.
242
Id. at 1099.
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
Id. at 1100.
246
Id. at 1099.
247
Id.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id.
240
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who testified, Richard Romney.251 Avila and Romney were ordered
to appear at a BOR disciplinary hearing.252 On the day of the
hearing, Avila resigned to accept a job offer with another law
enforcement agency.253 The BOR continued the hearing against Avila
without him present.254 The BOR ultimately determined that Avila
was guilty of insubordination and recommended his termination.255
Avila then brought an anti-retaliation charge against the City.256 The
City moved for summary judgment, arguing the Avila’s FLSA claim
was precluded because he never sought judicial review of the BOR
decision.257 The jury found in favor of Avila and awarded him
$50,000 in liquidated damages and $579,400 in attorneys’ fees.258
The City appealed.259
State agency determinations are “entitled to preclusive effect if
three requirements are satisfied: ‘(1) that the administrative agency
act in a judicial capacity, (2) that the agency resolve disputed issues
of fact properly before it, and (3) that the parties have an adequate
opportunity to litigate.’”260 The City argued that Avila never
properly appealed the BOR decision and that the agency
determination should preclude his FLSA retaliation claim.261 The
BOR constitutes a state administrative agency acting in a judicial
capacity; however, the court of appeals found that because the BOR
never addressed the issue of retaliation, there was no preclusion.262
There was no resolution of the disputed issue: Avila’s claim that his
termination was in retaliation for testifying in the Maciel trial.263

251

Id.
Id.
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
Id. The BOR also fired Officer Romney. Id.
256
Id.
257
Id.
258
Id.
259
Id.
260
Id. at 1100.
261
Id. at 1099.
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Id. at 1100.
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Id.
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On appeal, the City argued that the jury was not given proper
instructions.264 The district court followed Ninth Circuit law by
giving instructions to the jury that included the requirement for Avila
to prove that his testifying at the Maciel trial was a motivating factor
in his termination.265 The City attempted to include the “same
decision” affirmative defense on appeal; however, because the briefs
on appeal did not assert an error in the district court’s failure to
include the “same decision” instruction, the Ninth Circuit found that
the argument was waived.266 The City requested special instructions
in the jury trial to support its argument that Avila was fired because
he failed to request overtime and not because he testified.267 The
district court refused the special instructions and the Ninth Circuit
held that this refusal was not an abuse of discretion.268
Because the only evidence that Avila was failing to seek overtime
pay was his testimony in the FLSA suit, the City could not avoid the
retaliation claim.269 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
finding that Avila was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for
testifying in Maciel’s FLSA suit.270 The Ninth Circuit also found no
abuse of discretion in the award of attorneys’ fees or liquidated
damages. 271
Impact
Under most circumstances, claims against state agencies must
follow the administrative procedure for appeals, and those
administrative decisions would preclude an individual from bringing
a further civil claim.272 However, the requirements for preclusion
exist for a case such as this one. While Avila may not have followed
the proper procedure for appealing the BOR decision, the BOR

264

Id.
Id. at 1101.
266
Id. at 1100.
267
Id. at 1101.
268
Id. at 1105.
269
Id. at 1100.
270
Id. at 1105.
271
Id.
272
Id. at 1100.
265
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determination was made on improper grounds. Anti-retaliation laws
within the FLSA exist to protect employees from being punished for
speaking up about labor law violations and to encourage employees
to participate in FLSA lawsuits.273 The LAPD singled out the two
individuals who testified at Maciel’s trial for a BOR investigation
and wrongfully terminated their employment.274 The dissenting
judge in this case did not find the “same decision” defense to be
waived and found ample evidence to support that defense; however,
the panel affirmed the district court’s decision and clarified the
circumstances in which state administrative agencies do not preclude
individuals’ FLSA claims.275
Young v. United States,
769 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2014)
Synopsis
While visiting Mount Rainier National Park, Plaintiff Donna
Young fell into a twelve-foot hole near the Park’s main visitor center
and suffered serious injuries.276 The Young family brought suit
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),
alleging that the National Park Service (NPS) was negligent in failing
to warn of a hazard that it both knew of and created.277 The district
court dismissed the Youngs’ claim, finding that the action was barred
by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA because the
decision to warn visitors of hazards of a general nature in the park
was policy-driven and therefore protected.278
The Youngs
appealed.279 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the
decision not to warn of a known safety hazard was not a policy
consideration that the discretionary exception was designed to

273

Id.
Id. at 1101.
275
Id. at 1105.
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Young v. United States, 769 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2014).
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Id.
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protect.280 The court held that the Youngs’ claim was not barred and
remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.281
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling
In June 2010, Donna and her family visited Mt. Rainier National
Park while on vacation in Washington.282 They arrived at the park in
the early evening and decided to walk around near the visitor center
before the park closed.283 Across the road from the visitor center was
an empty field that was typically covered by snow for most of the
year.284 There was a transformer that sat in the field and was used to
power the visitor center building.285 The snowfall regularly covered
the transformer, which released heat as it transferred electricity from
nearby power lines to the visitor center.286 There was no sign or
warning of the transformer’s presence, so when Donna Young
walked over to the field, she fell twelve feet into a hole created by the
melting snow around the transformer.287 She sustained severe
injuries as a result of the fall.288
The Youngs sued the United States under the FTCA.289 The
FTCA allows individuals to recover money damages for injuries
caused by negligent acts of government employees.290 The Youngs
alleged that the NPS knew about the hazard, but negligently failed to
warn visitors.291 The Government moved to dismiss the Youngs’
claim, arguing that the claim was barred by the discretionary function
exception to the FTCA.292 Under the discretionary function
exception, “[a]ny claim based upon . . . the exercise or performance
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or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty
on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused,” does not receive
waiver of immunity.293
In order to determine whether the discretionary function
exception applied to the NPS’s actions, the district court applied
Berkovitz’s two-step inquiry.294
Step One of the Berkovitz Test: Discretion
In Berkowitz,295 the Court held that an act is discretionary if it is
“a matter of choice for the acting employee,” and “involves an
element of judgment or choice.”296 Therefore, the first step in the
Berkovitz analysis is to determine “whether the decision at issue
‘involve[d] an element of judgment or choice.’”297
Here, the parties agreed that the decision not to place warning
signs was discretionary because there was no established statute,
regulation, or policy requiring or prohibiting warning signs.298 The
decision not to place a sign was a matter of judgment for the Park
Service staff.299
Step Two of the Berkovitz Test: Policy
The second step in the Berkowitz analysis requires determining
whether the discretionary conduct was “of the kind that the
discretionary function exception was designed to shield.”300 In order
to meet this standard, the decision must be “grounded in social,
economic, and political policy.”301
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Here, the parties’ dispute lies in the determination of whether the
decision not to place warning signs at the site of the transformer was
policy-driven.302 The purpose of this requirement is to protect
administrative and legislative decisions from being second-guessed
by the judiciary.303 The NPS was created under a statute that
established “broad policy considerations that govern [the] NPS’s
management of national parks.”304 The NPS’s management policies
also require it to balance visitor safety against conservation and
access.305 However, the policies do not protect all decision the NPS
makes.306 Therefore, there must be some support that a particular
NPS decision was “actually susceptible to analysis under the policies
the government identified” for the discretionary function exception to
apply.307
While the decision not to provide warning signs on unmaintained
trails or other natural hazards in national parks would likely fall
within the policy requirement of the discretionary exception, the
decision not to warn visitors of a latent safety hazard created by the
park itself does not.308 Here, the transformer, and the snowmelt
danger that it created, was created by the NPS, not by nature.309
Therefore, the decision not to warn visitors of the transformer’s
presence was not a policy decision requirement and thus failed the
discretionary function exception.310 Under the FTCA, Plaintiffs’
claim was not barred, and the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court’s judgment.311
Impact
This case allowed the Ninth Circuit to establish a clear distinction
between discretionary actions that should be covered by the
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discretionary function exception and those that should not. The
exception to the FTCA is important in order to protect government
agencies from being subject to heavy judicial oversight of their
management decisions.312 The NPS would likely be better suited to
make decisions regarding trail maintenance and snow removal than
the courts, however, the importance of individual safety at any
government-run building, landmark, or park must be protected as
well.313 This case established important precedent for applying the
discretionary function exception by holding that the government is
accountable for dangers created by government agencies.314
Individuals can expect natural hazards in national parks, given that
they are areas of preserved wilderness; however, if an injury is
incurred due to an unexpected hazard created by the NPS, the
government agency should be held accountable.315
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